Global Insider: Meager Presence in Belarus Leaves EU Little Leverage

WPR: What is the current state of political and economic relations between the EU and Belarus?

Jana Kobzova: Icy is the word that best describes the political relationship between the two today. Relations were mildly better in 2009-2010, when the two sides talked about expanding cooperation. But when the regime of President Aliaksandr Lukashenka cracked down on anti-government protests in late 2010 and early 2011, the EU returned to its sanctions policy. More than 240 officials, including Lukashenka himself, and some 30 companies are now subject to travel bans and asset freezes within the EU.

Paradoxically, despite the political “deep freeze,” trade is flourishing: In 2011, Belarus’ exports to the EU rose by 221 percent, partly because Belarus devalued its currency, making its products cheaper. This year, Belarus’ trade balance with the EU was also boosted by a scheme in which gasoline and other oil products were disguised as solvents and thinners. This allowed Belarus to avoid paying approximately $1 billion in customs duty payments to Russia under the terms of the joint Customs Union agreement. Infuriated, Moscow insisted the scheme be stopped in September.

WPR: What are the goals of EU policy toward Belarus, and how have they evolved over the past few years?

Kobzova: In general, the EU wants Belarus to be a good neighbor: democratic, prosperous and open to business and cooperation on everything from energy security to migration. However, 18 years of Lukashenka’s rule show that little can be achieved as long as he remains in charge. The EU tried to launch a number of cooperation projects when relations were better, but contact with the government has been limited to a bare minimum since the EU reimposed sanctions. Funds and assistance have now been redirected toward civil society.

Today, the EU’s main goal is the release and rehabilitation of Belarusian political prisoners, and any deepening of Minsk’s relationship with Brussels remains conditional on fulfilling this demand. But in almost two years, the policy has achieved few results: Most political prisoners remain behind bars, and those that have been released have not been rehabilitated. The problem is that cooperation with the EU was limited for a long time. As a result, the EU’s presence in Belarus is still limited. Europe’s political and economic leverage is just not big enough to incentivize the regime to change, especially as Belarus continues to rely on Russia’s economic and political backing.

WPR: How are divisions within the EU affecting its Belarus policy, and how effective is Belarus at exploiting them?

Kobzova: The EU’s policy toward Belarus has not been perfectly united. Latvia and Lithuania, which have close trade links with Belarus, have always been more skeptical about sanctions. More recently, Slovenia objected to blacklisting one of the Belarusian oligarchs due to its national trade interests. But despite these differences, the EU’s disunity is not the main reason for lack of progress. More to blame for the lack of results are the fact that Minsk can rely on Moscow’s support and that the EU’s circle of friends remains small among Belarus’ broader society, business sector and bureaucracy.

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